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Pursuant to Article 71(1) of Regulation No. 1215/2012, 
of 12 December, on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Mat-
ters (Brussels Ia or Recast Regulation), the Regulation 
“shall not affect any conventions to which the Member 
States are parties and which, in relation to particular mat-
ters, govern jurisdiction or the recognition or enforcement 
of judgments”. The rule has not yet been the subject of a 
preliminary ruling by the CJEU, but there are four deci-
sions on its immediate – and virtually identical
1
 – predeces-
sor in Article 71 of the Brussels I Regulation
2
, three of 
which deal with the 1956 Geneva Convention on the Con-
tract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road 
(CMR)
3
, a treaty that came into force long before the Brus-
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  Apart from one comma that has been added in Article 71(1) of the Re-
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sels I Regulation did. Most of the decisions by national 
courts on jurisdiction rules in conventions on particular 
matters are also related to the transport sector. By contrast, 
the subject matter of the fourth and most recent judgment 
delivered by the CJEU is different: it examines the validity 
of a provision on jurisdiction contained in a convention 
enacted after the entry into force of the Brussels I Regula-
tion, the Benelux Convention on Intellectual Property of 
25 February 2005
4
, a situation that, as shall be seen in the 
next section, is not covered by Article 71 of the Brussels Ia 
Regulation. 
II. Scope of application of Article 71 of the Recast 
Albeit incomplete, Article 71(1) of the Brussels Ia Regu-
lation gives some clues as to its scope of application. In the 
first place, the rule only refers to conventions on “particu-
lar matters”, in the sense that those conventions that, in 
general, refer to jurisdiction or recognition and enforce-
ment are not covered by its scope of application. As a mat-
ter of fact, the conventions between Member States that 
only address the recognition and enforcement of judg-
ments have been superseded (Article 69 Brussels I Regula-
tion). Since the CMR mainly deals with a particular matter, 
the contract for the international carriage of goods by 
road, and only contains one provision that might enter in 
collision with the Brussels Regulation, there is no doubt 
that the Convention is covered by Article 71. 
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In the second place, although the provision employs the 
expression “conventions to which the Member States are 
parties”, it does not apply only to those conventions that 
have been concluded by all the Member States of the 
European Union. It becomes clear from the wording of 
Article 71(2)(a) that conventions to which only some 
Member States are parties are doubtlessly covered by its 
scope of application. Furthermore, although Article 71 
aims at preventing Member States from infringing their in-
ternational commitments
5
, it is also irrelevant whether one 




Finally, with respect to the temporal scope of application 
of the provision, it only applies to those conventions to 
which the Member States “are parties”. In this regard, it 
should be noted that Article 57 of the 1968 Brussels Con-
vention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments 
in Civil and Commercial Matters still referred to conven-
tions to which the Member States “are or will be” parties, 
making it clear that nothing in the Convention prevented 
the contracting states from concluding new conventions on 
particular matters or from amending conventions already 
in force. However, this wording was not reproduced in 
Article 71 of the Brussels I Regulation, so that no new spe-
cialised conventions can be concluded (or already existing 
ones amended) to introduce rules that would derogate the 
provisions in the Regulation
7
. 
The use of the word “concluded” in Recital 36 of the Re-
cast (rather than “ratified” or “entered into force”) in rela-
tion to specialised conventions raises doubt as to whether 
the date to be considered is that of the signature, of ratifi-
cation or accession, or that of entry into force. The 1969 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties does not define 
the expression. For some, the date of “conclusion” of a 
multilateral treaty is that of the signature of the Final Act 
or, where the case may be, the date when the convention is 
opened for signature, whichever is later
8
. Others, on the 
contrary, hold that “States which have ‘concluded’ are 
bound by a treaty without taking any further formal 
steps”
9
, so consent to be bound thereby is required, which 
usually implies ratification
10
. Since Article 71(1) of the Re-
cast refers to conventions to which the Member States “are 
parties” – which, as a general rule, does not seem possible 
without ratification – the second view appears to be more 
appropriate in this context. 
This being said, the relevant date from which on no new 
rules on jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement that col-
lide with the Brussels regime can be enacted by the Mem-
                                                                  
5
  Recital 25 of the Brussels I Regulation and Recital 35 of the Recast. 
6 See CJEU 13.7.2016, op.cit., nos. 49 and 50. 
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8
  Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice, 2000, 74. 
9
  Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, 2009, 78 et seq. 
10
  See European Commission, Vademecum on the external action of the 
European Union, SEC(2011)881, p. 38, albeit referred to the conclusion 
of agreements by the European Union. 
ber States is that of the entry into force of the Brussels I 
Regulation (and not that of the Recast)
11
: 1 March 2002 
(Article 76)
12
. The CMR Convention, for its part, came 
into force on 2 July 1961, and it has done so for virtually 
all Member States (except Cyprus and Malta, who declared 
their accession to the Convention in 2003 and 2007 respec-
tively) before the entry into force of the Brussels I Regula-
tion. Thus, Article 71 applies
13
 and the private international 
law rules in the Convention should prevail over the provi-
sions of the Recast. 
III. Provisions on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in the CMR Convention 
The relevant rules are mainly contained in Article 31 
CMR. Jurisdiction is envisaged by the first paragraph, lis 
pendens and res judicata by the second, and the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments is addressed in the third 
paragraph. As regards jurisdiction, pursuant to Article 
31(1) CMR, an action based on a carriage under the Con-
vention can be brought a) in any court or tribunal of a 
contracting country designated by agreement between the 
parties (e.g. by virtue of a jurisdiction clause in the con-
signment note); b) additionally – so only prorogation, but 
not derogation of jurisdiction is possible – in the courts or 
tribunals of a country within whose territory the defen-
dant is ordinarily resident, or has his principal place of 
business or the branch or agency through which the con-
tract of carriage was made; or the place where the goods 




Where an action is already pending
15
 before a court that 
is competent according to the aforementioned rules (lis 
pendens) or a judgment has been delivered by such a court 
(res judicata) with respect to a claim between the same par-
ties and on the same grounds, no new action shall be 
started, unless the judgment of the first court seised is not 
enforceable in the country in which the fresh proceedings 
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13
  BGH (DE) 18.12.2003, I ZR 228/01, unalex DE-20 (albeit for Article 
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unalex AT-31; Cour de Cassation (BE) 29.4.2004, C.02.0250.N, unalex 
BE-108. 
14
  Article 31 CMR only establishes international jurisdiction (courts or 
tribunals “of a country”), while territorial jurisdiction is governed by 
the autonomous rules of civil procedure of the State with international 
jurisdiction. See e.g. Jesser-Huß in MüKo HGB, Vol. 7, 3rd ed., Article 
31 CMR, no. 16; OGH (AT) 13.12.2002, 10 Nc 108/02t, unalex AT-
642. 
15
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though the decision was eventually overturned on appeal, for different 
reasons) or the moment when the action has been served to the defen-
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are brought [Article 31(2) CMR]. Finally, judgments en-
tered by a court of a contracting country that have become 
enforceable in that country shall become enforceable in 
each of the other contracting states of the Convention as 
soon as the formalities required in the country where en-
forcement is sought are fulfilled; nonetheless, such formali-
ties shall not permit the reopening of the merits of the case 
(Article 31(3) CMR). 
An action can also be brought before an arbitration tri-
bunal, whenever the parties agree to submit their disputes 
to arbitration and the relevant clause provides that the tri-
bunal shall apply the Convention (Article 33 CMR)
16
. 
Nonetheless, since the Brussels Ia Regulation does not ap-
ply to arbitration (Recital 12), there is no possible conflict 
between Article 33 CMR and Article 71 of the Recast. 
IV. The rulings of the Court of Justice in the TNT, Nip-
ponkoa and Kintra cases 
However clear the wording of Article 71 of the Brussels I 
and Ia Regulations, the Court of Justice has analysed the 
possibility of applying Article 31 CMR in the light of the 
Brussels regime as a whole in three different cases: TNT 
(2010), Nipponkoa (2013) and Kintra (2014)
17
. 
1. The TNT judgment of 4 May 2010: recognition and en-
forcement of judgments 
The facts of the case are as follows: In 2002, a contract 
for the carriage of goods between the Netherlands and 
Germany was entered into by Siemens Nederland as a 
shipper and TNT as a carrier. The goods were lost during 
transportation and the carrier filed an action against the in-
surer of the shipper (AXA) in Rotterdam (Netherlands) 
for a declaration that the carrier’s liability is limited to the 
amount envisaged by Article 23(3) CMR, as amended by 
the Geneva Protocol of 5 July 1978
18
. The claim was even-
tually dismissed by the Rotterdam court in 2005, but pend-
ing its decision, in 2004, the insurer filed an action for 
compensation of the full amount of the damages before the 
Landgericht München (Germany). The carrier appealed the 
Dutch decision to the Regional Court of ‘s-Gravenhage, 
but before its judgment was handed down the Landgericht 
                                                                  
16
  Arguably, the choice of an arbitral tribunal may derogate the jurisdic-
tion of national courts. See Haak, The Liability of the Carrier under 
the CMR (1986), 282-283; Jesser-Huß in MüKo HGB, op.cit., Art. 33 
CMR, no. 5a; Koller, Transportrecht, 9th ed., Art. 33 CMR, no. 1; Puetz 
in Arbitraje – Revista de Arbitraje Comercial y de Inversiones, 3/2011, 
869, 879 et seq.; OLG Koblenz (DE) 22.2.2007, 6 U 1162/06, unalex 
DE-1410; LG Gießen (DE) 31.7.2008, 8 O 81/07; LG Rostock (DE) 
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zur CMR, 2nd ed., no. 29; Helm, Frachtrecht II, 2nd ed., Art. 31 CMR, 
no. 21; OGH (AT) 5.5.2010, 7 Ob 216/09d, unalex AT-716, according 
to which a clause that assigns exclusive jurisdiction to an arbitral tribu-
nal is (at least partially) null and void (Article 41 CMR). 
17
  Supra note 3. 
18
  The Protocol replaced the reference to the Germinal franc in Article 23 
CMR with the Special Drawing Right (SDR) as defined by the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund. With respect to the loss of goods, Article 23(3) 
CMR now limits the amount of compensation to 8.33 SDR per kilo-
gram of gross weight short. 
München ruled on the merits, having previously dismissed 
the carrier’s contention that the lis pendens rule in Article 
31(2) CMR prevented the court from hearing the action. 
The insurer then requested enforcement of the decision in 
the Netherlands, which was granted by an Utrecht court. 
However, the decision was appealed by the carrier to the 
Hoge Raad der Nederlanden, who then referred the matter 
to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling to decide, 
inter alia, whether the lis pendens rules in Article 31 CMR 
take precedence over those in the Brussels I Regulation and 
whether the enforcing court was allowed to review the ju-
risdiction of the court of the Member State of origin. 
Unfortunately, the CJEU fails to give a clear answer to 
the questions referred by the Hoge Raad
19
. According to 
the Court, to the extent to which Article 71 of the Brussels 
I Regulation and of the Recast does not only apply to the 
relationships between a Member State and a third country 
but also to judicial proceedings that involve two Member 
States, the application of a specialised convention may not 
compromise the principles which underlie judicial coop-
eration in civil and commercial matters in the European 
Union
20
. On the basis of these considerations, a test – we 
might call it the “TNT test” – is established, according to 
which the rules governing jurisdiction, recognition and en-
forcement laid down by a convention on particular matters 
apply, but only “provided that they are highly predictable, 
facilitate the sound administration of justice and enable the 
risk of concurrent proceedings to be minimised and that 
they ensure, under conditions at least as favourable as 
those provided for by the Regulation, the free movement 
of judgments in civil and commercial matters and mutual 
trust in the administration of justice in the European Un-
ion (favor executionis)”. 
As becomes clear from a simple lecture of the above 
quote, the TNT test is hardly appropriate for providing le-
gal certainty, which is why it has been harshly criticised in 
legal literature
21
. Furthermore, it seems to be contrary to 
the wording of Article 71 of the Brussels I(a) Regulations. 
But be that as it may, the conclusion to be drawn from the 
TNT judgment is that the enforcing court may not review 
the jurisdiction of the court of the Member State of origin, 
whatever the rule in Article 31 CMR. Certainly, this is not 
the final answer given in the ruling, but the CJEU ex-
pressly refers to its earlier decision in the Allianz and Gen-
                                                                  
19
  This is probably due to the fact that the Court lacks jurisdiction to in-
terpret Article 31 CMR: the Convention is no part of the acquis com-
munautaire, which is recognised by the Court itself in nos. 57 et seq. of 
the decision in the TNT case. See however CJEU 19.12.2013, op.cit., 
nos. 40 et seq., and 4.9.2014, op.cit., nos. 35 et seq., where the Court 
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out by Mankowski, in Transportrecht, 4/2014, 129, 134, the CJEU al-
ready had to analyse Article 31 in its TNT judgment in order to com-
pare it with the rules in the Brussels I Regulation. 
20
  That is, the principles of free movement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters, predictability as to the courts having jurisdiction 
and therefore legal certainty for litigants, sound administration of jus-
tice, minimisation of the risk of concurrent proceedings, and mutual 
trust in the administration of justice in the European Union. 
21
  See e.g. the references in Mankowski, in TranspR, 4/2014, 129, 131 et 
seq.; Mankowski in: Magnus/Mankowski, Brussels I Regulation, 2nd ed., 
no. 4a et seq.; Tuo/Carpaneto, op.cit., 153 et seq. 
 
 





erali Assicurazioni Generali case, pursuant to which the 
court of the State where recognition and enforcement is 
sought is never in a better position than the court of the 
State of origin to determine whether the latter had jurisdic-
tion to hear the case
22
. 
2. The Nipponkoa judgment of 19 December 2013: lis 
pendens and res judicata 
The facts that underlie the Nipponkoa case are strikingly 
similar to those in the TNT judgment. After certain goods 
were lost during a carriage by road between the Nether-
lands and Germany, the shipper brought an action against 
the contracting carrier in Germany. However, by the time 
the dispute was settled in 2010, one of the transport sub-
contractors had already obtained a negative declaratory 
judgment against the contracting carrier in the Nether-
lands, according to which his liability was limited to the 
amount envisaged by Article 23(3) CMR. Thus, when the 
liability insurer of the contracting carrier brought an in-
demnity action against the transport sub-contractor in 
Germany, the latter claimed that the proceedings could not 
be pursued on account of the final negative declaratory 
judgment handed down in the Netherlands. 
In this context, the German Bundesgerichtshof referred 
two questions to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling. As re-
gards the first question – in which the Bundesgerichtshof 
inquired whether Article 71 of the Brussels I Regulation 
precludes an entirely autonomous interpretation of a spe-
cialised convention, in the sense that the objectives and 
principles of the Regulation have to be considered – the 
Court reiterates, as was to be expected from the outset, its 
ruling in the TNT case. The answer to the second question, 
however, has far-reaching consequences for the transport 
sector, since it deals with the effects of a so-called negative 
declaratory action, mainly with respect to the lis pendens 
and res judicata rules in the CMR Convention. 
Such negative declaratory actions have their origin in a 
different interpretation of the CMR Convention in the 





, the provision refers the an-
swer to the question as to whether there is a category of 
negligence that is considered “as equivalent to” dol or wil-
ful misconduct to national law. This rule has given rise to 
forum shopping all around Europe
25
, although the most 
well-known example is that of Germany and the Nether-
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  CJEU 10.2.2009, C-185/07, Allianz SpA and Generali Assicurazioni 
Generali SpA ./. West Tankers Ins., unalex EU-171, no. 29. 
23
  Pursuant to Article 29(1) CMR, the limitations to the liability of the 
carrier laid down in the Convention shall not apply where he acted 
with wilful misconduct or by such default as, in accordance with the 
law of the forum state, is considered as equivalent thereto. 
24
 A first problem raised by the provision is the fact that the two official 
language versions (English and French) do not match entirely, since the 
French concept of “dol” is more restrictive than the common law con-
cept of “wilful misconduct”. 
25
  Divergent interpretations of other provisions of the CMR in the con-
tracting States, e.g. those on the charges to be reimbursed by the carrier 
(see infra in the text), give also rise to forum shopping, but the most 
relevant issue is doubtlessly Article 29 CMR. 
lands. While German courts are feared for their utmost se-
verity with respect to road carriers, thus many judgments 
resulting in the non-application of the limitations to the li-
ability of the carrier, the approach of Dutch courts is more 
lenient
26
. As a consequence, where permitted by the juris-
diction rules in Article 31 CMR, carriers frequently seek a 
“negative declaratory judgment” from a “carrier-friendly” 
Dutch forum that declares the absence of liability (or, at 
least, the non-application of Article 29 CMR) before the 
person entitled to compensation files a (positive) action for 
damages in a forum like Germany, that is not
27
. 
Specifically, the question referred to the CJEU aimed at 
clarifying whether a negative declaratory action and a 
(positive) action for performance have the same cause of 
action and the same object in order to trigger the applica-
tion of the rules on lis pendens and res judicata. The doubt 
arises because, while the cause of action (i.e. the facts and 
the rule of law relied on as the basis of the different ac-
tions) is the same, the object (i.e. the end the actions have 
in view)
28
 seems to be different: in the case of a negative 
declaratory action, the declaration that the claimant is not 
liable (or that he is liable only to a certain extent); in the 
case of an action for performance, the order to pay dam-
ages to the claimant. 
Certainly, the identity of the object of an action seeking 
compensation for loss and that of a previous action 
brought by the defendant seeking a declaration that he is 
not liable for that loss had already been established by the 
Court in its 1992 Tatry judgment
29
. However, while the 
1952 Convention on the Arrest of Sea-Going Ships – 
which was the rule of law to be applied in the Tatry case – 
did not contain any rules on lis pendens or related actions 
(so the 1968 Brussels Convention applied directly), Article 
31 CMR contemplates provisions on both lis pendens and 
res judicata. As a consequence, the Bundesgerichtshof had 
traditionally held that the CJEU’s Tatry decision is not di-
rectly applicable to the international carriage of goods by 
road and that, interpreting the CMR Convention in an 
autonomous manner, the filing of a negative declaratory 
action in one State does not preclude the shipper or the 
                                                                  
26
  This is so because only intentional and consciously reckless miscon-
duct entails the obligation to pay full compensation. See e.g. the judg-
ment of the Hoge Raad (NL) of 5.1.2001, C99/162HR, Cigna v Over-
beek. 
27
  The situation described in the text is sometimes referred to as “The 
Dutch Trick” (“Der holländische Trick”). See Hoeks, in: 
Soyer/Tettenborn, Carriage of Goods by Sea, Land and Air (2013). 
There appear to be cases where carriers have filed an action for negative 
declaratory relief even before notifying the sender or consignee of the 
loss or damage. In detail on the controversy on this issue between 
German and Dutch courts see Haak, in TranspR, 5/2009, 189 et seq. 
28
  Note that the English version of Article 27 (1) of the Brussels I Regula-
tion and 29 (1) of the Recast does not distinguish between “cause” and 
“object” of an action. However, the CJEU had already established in 
its Tatry decision (see infra) with respect to the predecessor of both 
provisions in Article 21 of the Brussels Convention that “that language 
version must […] be construed in the same manner as the majority of 
the other language versions in which that distinction is made” (no. 37). 
29
  CJEU 6.12.1994, C-406/92, The owners of the cargo lately laden on 









consignee from bringing an action for performance (i.e. for 
damages) in another State
30
. 
In its Nipponkoa judgment, the Court held that the prin-
ciples that underlie the Brussels I Regulations (specifically, 
the aim of minimising the risk of concurrent proceedings) 
preclude an interpretation of Article 31(2) CMR according 
to which an action for negative declaratory relief has not 
the same “cause of action” in the sense of Articles 27(1) of 
the Brussels I Regulation and 29(1) of the Recast. Accord-
ingly, once a negative declaratory action has been filed, no 
(fresh) action seeking compensation can be brought be-
tween the same parties (or their successors, in particular, 
insurance companies)
31
. If one of the parties nonetheless 
brings a new action, the court seised in the second place 
has to stay the proceedings until a judgment is delivered by 
the court seised in the first place
32
. 
3. The Kintra judgment of 4 September 2014: rules on ju-
risdiction 
The CJEU’s Kintra decision is a rara avis among the 
judgments that deal with the relationship between the 
CMR and the Brussels I(a) Regulations, since it is delivered 
within the framework of an insolvency procedure against 
one of the parties involved. Accordingly, in its first ques-
tion referred for a preliminary ruling, the Lithuanian Su-
preme Court asked whether an action for the payment of a 
debt that derives from an international carriage of goods 
by road falls within the scope of application of Regulation 
No. 1346/2000 – recently replaced by Regulation (EU) 
No. 2015/848, of 20 May 2015, on Insolvency Proceedings 
– or of the Brussels I(a) Regulations. By holding that the 
action is not closely connected with the insolvency pro-
ceedings since it could have been brought by the creditor 
before the winding-up of the debtor – in which case the ac-
tion would have been subject to the ordinary rules govern-
ing jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters – the Court 
ruled that jurisdiction is governed by the Brussels I(a) 
Regulation. 
The referring court also asked whether, if the Brussels 
Regulation applies, jurisdiction has to be determined ac-
cording to the latter or applying the rules concerning juris-
diction in the CMR. Although in its earlier decision in the 
TNT case the Court had ascertained that it lacked jurisdic-
tion to interpret Article 31 CMR, in the Kintra judgment it 
did analyse the provision in the light of Article 71(1) of the 
Brussels Ia Regulation. After reproducing its findings in 
the TNT ruling, it eventually concludes that the rules on 
jurisdiction in Article 31(1) CMR are consistent with the 
requirements established in the decision (the “TNT test”), 
                                                                  
30
  For the former position in Germany see BGH 20.11.2003, I ZR 102/02 
and I ZR 294/02, unalex DE-15 and DE-16. 
31
  This conclusion had already been reached by the Austrian OGH in a 
decision of 17.2.2006, 10 Ob 147/05y, unalex AT-260. 
32
  See Rechtbank Arnhem (NL) 27.6.2007, 153815/HA ZA 07-534, 
unalex NL-984, that analyses the opposite situation: the claim for dam-
ages was filed before the negative declaratory action was brought. 
even though the precept envisages two places of perform-
ance (the place where the goods were taken over by the 
carrier and the place designated for delivery) while Article 
7(1)(b) of the Recast only mentions one. It did so for two 
reasons. On the one hand, because the Court had previ-
ously accepted that, under a contract of carriage, the claim-
ant might have the choice between the courts of the place 
of departure and that of arrival
33
; on the other hand, be-
cause the criteria of proximity, predictability and legal cer-
tainty are fulfilled, since the courts are easily identified and 
the applicant’s choice is limited to previously determined 
judicial fora. Consequently, whenever the matter at hand 
falls within the scope of application of the CMR, the 
courts in the Member States may apply the rules on juris-
diction contained therein. 
V. Other issues related to the rules on jurisdiction and 
recognition or enforcement in the CMR 
Although the judgments by the Court of Justice shed 
some light on the interpretation of Article 31 CMR in the 
light of the Brussels I regime, one cannot but think that 
some of the problems addressed by the CJEU would not 
even exist if Article 71 of the Regulations were applied in 
its proper terms. But then again, the existence of a Euro-
pean Area of Civil Justice may well justify a “particular” 
(and harmonised) interpretation of the rules on jurisdiction 
and recognition or enforcement in the CMR when all 
countries involved are Member States of the EU. Be that as 
it may, apart from the questions analysed hereabove, there 
are still other issues worth mentioning, most of which have 
not (yet) been addressed by the CJEU. 
1. Jurisdiction 
As regards jurisdiction, it should be borne in mind that 
the fora established by the CMR are no exclusive fora in 
the sense of Article 24 of the Recast, so that an eventual 
lack of jurisdiction cannot be declared ex officio by the 
court (ex Articles 26 and 27)
34
, unless the defendant does 
not enter an appearance (Article 28(1)). If he does appear 
but fails to submit pleas as to the merits of the case, the 
court seised may, when deciding on its own jurisdiction, 
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a) Jurisdiction clauses inserted in the contract of carriage 
With respect to jurisdiction clauses, although Article 
31(1) CMR expressly permits their inclusion in the con-
tract of carriage, it remains unclear which are the formal 
requirements for a valid agreement on jurisdiction. In the 
absence of any indication in Article 31(1) CMR, it might 
be alleged that the form requirements established in Article 
25 of the Recast apply. It should, however, be noted that 
Article 31(1) CMR is lex specialis with respect to the Euro-
pean Union provisions on jurisdiction
36
 (Article 71 of the 
Recast). But if the latter do not apply, it is still unclear 
which rules are to be considered. While some tribunals 
take recourse to the lex fori
37





 there is no need for a recourse to na-
tional law, since the CMR does not establish any formal 
requirements. If this were so, the agreement on jurisdiction 
would be valid whatever its form; a conclusion that seems 
adequate in view of the fact that only prorogation but not 
derogation of jurisdiction is possible
40
. It is nonetheless ad-
visable to include the jurisdiction clause in the consign-
ment note, since it is enforceable against the consignee 
only if he is aware thereof upon receipt of the goods
41
. 
As to the effects of a validly agreed jurisdiction clause, 
unlike Article 25(1) of the Recast, Article 31(1) CMR only 
allows for additional fora. Since all stipulations that are 
contrary to the Convention are considered to be null and 
void (Article 41(1) CMR), a jurisdiction clause that estab-
lishes an exclusive forum is unenforceable. It seems, how-
ever, reasonable to consider that not the whole clause is 
null and void
42
, but that the nullity is only partial, in the 




b) Connected claims and successive carriage under Arti-
cles 34 et seq. CMR 
In many contracting States of the CMR, successive car-
riage as envisaged by Articles 34 et seq. CMR
44
 is a modal-
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  “If carriage governed by a single contract is performed by successive 
road carriers, each of them shall be responsible for the performance of 
the whole operation, the second carrier and each succeeding carrier be-
coming a party to the contract of carriage, under the terms of the con-
 
ity hardly ever found in practice
45
. However, the courts of 
some countries adopt a wide interpretation of Article 34 
CMR to cover situations in which the first or contractual 
carrier (who celebrates the contract of carriage with the 
shipper) does not even receive the cargo (i.e. a so-called 
“paper carrier”)
46
. If a transport operation is considered a 
successive carriage, Article 36 CMR allows the shipper or 
the consignee to bring a claim against the first or the last 
carrier, as well as the carrier who performed the leg where 
the damage occurred. However, the question arises 
whether all actions can be brought in the same court. The 
issue is relevant since, depending on the court seised, the 
interpretation of Article 29 CMR may vary and some du-
ties and charges are to be reimbursed or not by the carrier 
under Article 23(4) CMR
47
. 
To bring a claim against all successive carriers in one sin-
gle forum is of course possible if the contract of carriage 
contains a jurisdiction clause, but such an agreement can 
only be invoked vis-à-vis the succeeding carriers if they 
have accepted it, e.g., by accepting the consignment note 
containing the clause
48
. On the contrary, in the absence of a 
binding jurisdiction clause it does not seem possible to sue 
all carriers by way of a single action, since the CMR does 
not refer to “connected claims” in the sense of Article 8 (1) 
of the Recast
49
. Article 36 CMR cannot be invoked either, 
because it only envisages the standing to be sued, but does 
not contain a rule on jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of a 
court can thus only be established by application of Article 
31 CMR, so that every one of the successive carriers has to 
be sued in one of the fora envisaged by the Convention 
(which may, however, coincide). 
c) Multimodal transport and the rules on jurisdiction in 
Article 31 CMR 
A last problem worth mentioning is the possibility of in-
voking Article 31 CMR within the framework of a multi-
modal transport. The problem lies with the fact that CMR 
does not apply to multimodal transports as a whole, at 
least when different from a ro-ro or piggyback transport 
(Article 2 CMR), but it usually does apply to the interna-
tional road leg when the damage was caused during car-
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riage by road. It is not clear, however, whether it applies 
autonomously or directly to such a road leg. For the Eng-
lish Court of Appeal
50
, it seems to do so, although the rele-
vant judgments refer to the application of Article 29 CMR. 
On the contrary, the rules on jurisdiction of the CMR 
should not apply “directly” as regards the multimodal 
transport as a whole
51
, and although there is an interna-
tional road leg, Article 31 CMR cannot be invoked. It is 
indeed undesirable to give jurisdiction to all courts men-
tioned in any one of the sector specific conventions and 
acts that may apply to the different legs of a multimodal 
transport, because it would impose on the multimodal 
transport operator the risk of facing legal claims in an infi-
nite number of fora. Legal certainty and predictability, as 
required by the CJEU in its TNT judgment, could not be 
guaranteed any more. 
While no international regulation on multimodal trans-
port comes into force, Brussels Ia Regulation should rather 
apply directly (within the European Union) so that, in the 
absence of a jurisdiction clause, the operator can only be 
sued at his domicile or at the place where the services were 
provided or should have been provided
52
. However, where 
the operator brings an action against the road carrier sub-
contracted by him (or vice versa), it seems obvious that the 
fora envisaged by Article 31(1) CMR apply. 
2. Lis pendens 
As explained above, Article 31(2) CMR establishes that, 
where an action is pending before or a judgment has been 
entered by a tribunal, no second action is possible when 
both the parties and the ground of action are the same. The 
relevant difference between this rule and its equivalent in 
Article 29(1) of the Recast has to be seen in the fact that 
Article 31(2) CMR requires the action to be pending be-
fore a tribunal that is competent under paragraph 1 (i.e. a 
tribunal that has jurisdiction according to the rules laid 
down in the Convention itself), while Article 29(1) of the 
Recast omits any reference to the competence of the court 
seised in the first place. 
The main problem related to lis pendens in the CMR is 
the question as to whether a negative declaratory action 
triggers the application of the lis pendens rule in the Con-
vention. Since this issue has been resolved by the CJEU in 
its Nipponkoa decision, I would like to briefly address a 
second problem, generally referred to as the “Italian tor-
pedo”, i.e. the seizure of a court that lacks jurisdiction in 
order to delay a decision on the merits. Under the 1968 
Brussels Convention and the Brussels I Regulation, this 
was possible even where an agreement between the parties 
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place where the goods are taken over by the multimodal transport op-
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had conferred exclusive jurisdiction on a single court or 
tribunal: according to the CJEU
53
, the court seised in the 
second place, even having exclusive jurisdiction by virtue 
of an agreement between the parties, had to stay proceed-
ings. 
This situation is only partially envisaged in Article 31(2) 
of the Recast, pursuant to which any tribunal seised has to 
stay the proceedings until the court upon which a jurisdic-
tion agreement confers exclusive jurisdiction declares that 
it has no jurisdiction to hear the case. The problem lies 
with the fact that, as has been shown above, Article 31(1) 
CMR – which prevails over the presumption of exclusivity 
established in Article 25 of the Brussels Ia Regulation – 
only allows for non-exclusive choice of jurisdiction agree-
ments. As a consequence, Article 31(2) of the Recast can-
not possibly apply in relation to a contract for the interna-
tional carriage of goods by road. 
3. Recognition and enforcement of judgments 
Finally, as regards the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments, the CMR establishes that a (final)
54
 judgment 
that has become enforceable in the state where it was en-
tered shall be enforceable in any other contracting state “as 
soon as the formalities required in the country concerned” 
have been fulfilled (Article 31(3) CMR). Such formalities 
are those of the Brussels Ia Regulation whenever both 
countries involved are Member States of the European Un-
ion (Article 71(2)(b) of the Recast)
55
, so that an exequatur 
procedure, which has been abolished by the Brussels Ia 
Regulation, should not be required. 
Consequently, the recognition and enforcement of a 
judgment can only be refused on the basis of the grounds 
envisaged by Article 45 of the Recast. On the contrary, 
recognition may not be denied on the ground of a lack of 
jurisdiction on the part of the court that rendered the 
judgment, since such a refusal would affect the free move-
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VI. Quid iuris when the European Union has acceded to 
or approved the relevant convention? 
Some of the most recent conventions on the international 
carriage of goods and passengers envisage the possibility 
that “regional economic integration organisations” such as 
the EU accede thereto. This is the case, e.g., for the Con-
vention concerning International Carriage by Rail (CO-
TIF), as amended by the 1999 Vilnius Protocol (Article 38 
COTIF/1999); or for the Montreal Convention (MC) for 
the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage 
by Air (Article 53(2) MC). In exercise of this power, the 
EU deposited its instrument of approval of the Montreal 
Convention, together with the instruments of ratification 
of all Member States, on 29 April 2004
57
 and declared its 
accession to the COTIF on 23 June 2011
58
. 
According to the concept of “conclusion” analysed here-
above, both conventions were concluded (and came into 
force) some years after the Brussels I Regulation entered 
into force
59
, so Article 71 of the Recast arguably does not 
apply
60
. The solution might be different if the agreements 
had been ratified by the Member States prior to the entry 
into force of the Regulation – the Montreal Convention 
was signed on 28 May 1999 and the Vilnius Protocol on 3 
June 1999 – and there is still some doubt with respect to 
those States who ratified the Conventions before becoming 
Member States of the EU. 
But be that as it may, the situation has certainly changed 
with the approval of the MC and the accession to the CO-
TIF on the part of the EU itself. Pursuant to Article 216(1) 
TFEU, the European Union may conclude agreements 
with other countries or with international organisations, 
which are then binding both upon the institutions of the 
Union and on its Member States (Article 216(2) TFEU). 
And since the agreements concluded by the EU itself are a 
part of Community law from the moment of their entry 
into force for the Union
61
, it seems appropriate to apply 
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Article 67 of the Recast rather than Article 71
62
, which 
gives preference to provisions governing jurisdiction, lis 
pendens and the recognition and enforcement of judgments 
contained in instruments of the EU
63
. A similar result can 
be achieved if it is understood, with the Court of Justice, 
that agreements concluded by the Union prevail over the 
provisions of secondary Community legislation
64
. 
While this solution should not give rise to major prob-
lems where the carriage of goods is concerned (the rules on 
jurisdiction and lis pendens in Article 46 of the CIM Uni-
form Rules
65
 are virtually identical to those in Article 31 
CMR, and the fora envisaged by Article 33 MC are similar, 
although no action can be brought at the place of origin), 
the situation seems to be different for passenger transport, 
especially as regards carriage by rail. Indeed, pursuant to 
Article 57 § 1 of the CIV Uniform Rules
66
, actions based 
on the Rules can only be brought in a forum agreed by the 
parties or at the domicile of the defendant (or his principal 
place of business or the branch or agency which concluded 
the contract). No mention is made, either to the place of 
departure or to that of destination. Although the “defen-
dant” is not necessarily the rail undertaking that performed 
the carriage during which the damage occurred, but rather 
any carrier with standing to be sued according to Article 
56 of the CIV Rules, the choice of possible fora is still 
likely to be more limited than under the Recast Regulation. 
In the case of air transport, additionally to the traditional 
fora that already appeared in the 1929 Warsaw Convention 
(domicile of the carrier, principal place of business, place of 
business through which the contract was made, place of 
destination), an action can now also be brought in the State 
of residence of the passenger, albeit only in the case of 
death and injury of the latter (Article 33(2) MC), and pro-
vided that the carrier operates air services to or from this 
State. This so-called “fifth jurisdiction” awards a protec-
tion to the passenger that is not available under the Recast 
Regulation, because the special jurisdiction over consumer 
contracts does not apply to contracts of carriage (Article 
17(3) of the Recast). On the other hand, the fact that no ac-
tion can be brought at the place of origin might hamper the 
exercise of the passenger’s rights in the – more and more 
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Certainly, the rules on jurisdiction for actions related to 
the air passenger rights envisaged by Regulation 
No. 261/2004 are those in the Brussels I Regulation (and 
not, e.g., those in Article 33 MC)
68
, which should also be 
true with respect to the Rail Passenger Rights Regulation
69
. 
But the CJEU has not yet decided which set of rules shall 
prevail in the case of an action for compensation based on 
the MC or the COTIF. The question is particularly com-
plex with respect to rail transport, since Article 2 of the 
2011 Accession Agreement of the EU to the COTIF con-
tains a so-called “disconnection clause” in favour of Union 
rules in the mutual relations between Member States
70
. It is 
debatable, however, whether this clause – that does not ex-
ist in the agreement on the conclusion of the Montreal 
Convention, so arguably the fora envisaged by Article 33 
MC should apply directly – excludes the rules on jurisdic-
tion of the Convention and obliges to take recourse to the 
Brussels Ia regime. The arguments that advocate applying 
the Convention are certainly strong. In the first place, the 
Regulation is not mentioned in the “Declaration of compe-
tences” of the Union that accompanies the Accession 
Agreement
71
, which is a strong indicator of the fact that the 
European legislator did not have jurisdiction, recognition 
and enforcement in mind when he drew up the “discon-
nection clause”. In the second place, although the Brussels 
Ia Regulation is a “Union rule governing the particular 
subject concerned” in the sense of the “disconnection 
clause”, Article 67 of the Recast expressly provides for the 
preferential application of provisions contained in instru-
ments on specific matters (hic, the COTIF). 
Nonetheless, in a recent case, the French Cour de Cass-
ation held that Article 2 of the Accession Agreement pre-
vents the application of the rules on jurisdiction in the 
Convention and applied the Recast
72
. This approach not 
only provides for a better protection of passengers in in-
ternational rail transport; it also resolves some tricky issues 
in relation to actions based on the Rail Passenger Rights 
Regulation
73
. In my opinion, the Cour de Cassation has 
lost a magnificent opportunity to submit a request for a 
preliminary ruling to the CJEU that might have shed some 
further light on this problem. 
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VI. Conclusive Remarks 
The wording of Article 71 of the Recast seems to be clear 
in the sense that the rules on jurisdiction and on recogni-
tion or enforcement of judgments in specialised conven-
tions concluded before the Brussels I Regulation came into 
force shall prevail over the provisions contained in the 
Regulation itself. However, in its important judgment in 
the TNT case, the CJEU held that the principles that un-
derlie the Regulation shall in any case be respected, espe-
cially those of free movement of judgments and mutual 
trust in the administration of justice within the Union. The 
decision has been the object of severe – and justified – 
criticism, due to the legal uncertainty it generates. But it is 
equally true that Article 71 of the Recast mainly aims at 
preventing Member States from infringing their obligations 
vis-à-vis third States, while jurisdiction, recognition and 
enforcement between the Member States are, as a general 
rule, governed by the Recast itself. By establishing the ob-
ligation to respect the basic principles of the Brussels 
Regulation, the CJEU contributes to harmonise the inter-
pretation of private international law rules in international 
conventions on particular matters. In this sense, although 
there certainly is some dynamite in TNT, it nonetheless 
fosters the integration of the Member States in a single 
European Area of Civil Justice. 
Be that as it may, the decisions on Article 71 of the Brus-
sels Regulation still leave many questions unanswered. 
This is especially true for the conventions to which the 
European Union itself is a contracting party. While, as a 
general rule, such conventions should fall within the scope 
of application of Article 67 of the Recast, the existence of a 
“disconnection clause” like that in Article 2 of the Acces-
sion Agreement to the 1999 COTIF Convention might 
lead to the direct application of the Brussels regime. But, 
however desirable this result might be to the extent to 
which it enhances the protection of passengers in interna-
tional traffic, its compatibility with EU law is question-
able. A clarifying judgment of the CJEU would be neces-
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